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I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2012 Supreme Court term was supposed to be remembered as the
beginning of the end of race-based government decision making. Fisher v.
University of Texas2 and Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder,3 were supposed to clarify the legality of racial classifications in both university ad1.
Joshua P. Thompson, Senior Staff Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation. Mr.
Thompson served as lead counsel for the Pacific Legal Foundation, Center for Equal Opportunity, and American Civil Rights Foundation on their amicus brief to the Supreme Court in
Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder.
2.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
3.
Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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missions and voting. Additionally, two cases from the 2013 term—Mount
Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount Holly4 and
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmation Action5—dealt with the legality
of racial classifications in federal housing and state government respectively. With three of the four cases completed, it is fair to say that governmental
race-based classifications have survived.
In Fisher, the Supreme Court issued a 7-1 opinion remanding the case
to the Fifth Circuit with instructions on how to properly analyze the program under strict scrutiny.6 Mount Holly was dismissed on the eve of oral
argument under circumstances reminiscent of Magner v. Gallagher.7
Schuette has yet to be decided.
Shelby County, on the other hand, was a 5-4 opinion declaring section
4(b) of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional.8 Insofar as the coverage
formula authorized by Congress in 2006 is concerned, the Court’s opinion
provides clarity. No longer may Congress base the preclearance coverage
formula on data collected from the Lyndon Johnson-Barry Goldwater Presidential vote.9 A new coverage formula is needed for preclearance to be
enforced.
Despite the outrage following Shelby County,10 the outcome was foreseen by many.11 Even before Congress reauthorized the Voting Rights Act
4.
Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d
375 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013).
5.
Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2012) (en
banc), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013).
6.
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419-22.
7.
See Ralph Kasarda, Settlement in Disparate Impact Case Means More Government Discrimination, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. LIBERTY BLOG (Nov. 14, 2013, 12:50 PM),
http://blog.pacificlegal.org/2013/settlement-in-disparate-impact-case-means-moregovernment-discrimination. During the 2011 term, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a
different case challenging the legality of a disparate impact cause of action under the Fair
Housing Act. See Magner v. Gallagher, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 123 S.
Ct. 994. However, after pressure from the Obama Administration, the City of St. Paul voluntarily dismissed its petition. See Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012); Editorial,
Squeezed in St. Paul, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2012, at A14.
8.
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
9.
The coverage was based in part on the voter registration numbers on November
1, 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b)(2) (2008), invalidated by Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 .
10.
See, e.g., Zachary Roth, Supreme Court Guts Landmark Civil Rights Law,
MSNBC (June 25, 2013), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/supreme-court-guts-landmarkcivil-rights-law; Sherrilyn Ifill, President and Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Court Rejects Congress’ Determination of Where the Voting
Rights Act Should Apply, Leaving Voters Unprotected, NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC.
FUND (June 25, 2013), http://www.naacpldf.org/update/supreme-court-ruling-voting-rightsopens-door-wave-minority-voter-suppression.
11.
See Joshua Thompson, Shelby County v. Holder: Forget the Coverage Formula, What About the Effects Test?, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 12, 2013),
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in 2006, scholars were urging Congress to amend the coverage formula in
order to save preclearance.12 In 2009, a unanimous Supreme Court asked
Congress to do the same.13 “Congress could have updated the coverage
formula at that time, but did not do so. Its failure to act [left the Supreme
Court] with no choice but to declare § 4(b) unconstitutional.”14
For opponents of governmental racial classifications, the disappointing
nature of the Shelby County decision stems not from its predictable result,
but rather that the unconstitutionality of the coverage formula was the only
result. The constitutionality of section 5 was before the Court, but it declined to address it.15 The Court’s reluctance to address the deeper issues
will likely necessitate future litigation. Indeed, less than a month after Shelby County, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a new lawsuit seeking to
reimpose preclearance on the State of Texas.16 Further, Congress may even
undertake the arduous process of creating a new coverage formula—one
that targets the most discriminatory jurisdictions of today—even though the
preclearance may be unconstitutional.17
Given the continuing validity of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
and the strong desire by some to see preclearance reintroduced, this Article
examines the most pernicious aspect of that law: the effects test. While the
coverage formula was certainly problematic, insofar as it seriously en-

http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/shelby-county-v-holderforget-the-coverage-formulawhat-about-the-effects-test/ (“Despite many claims to the contrary, the sky will not fall when
the Court strikes down section 5’s coverage formula. The constitutional problems are easily
fixed.”).
12.
See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, Options and Strategies for Renewal of Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act, 49 HOW. L.J. 717, 723 (2006) (describing the over- and underinclusiveness of the coverage formula); Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act a Victim of its Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710 (2004); DAVID A. BOSITIS, JOINT
CTR. FOR POLITICAL & ECON. STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY
16 (2001) (noting no difference in the office holding rates of minorities in covered versus
non-covered jurisdictions).
13.
See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)
(“The evil that § 5 is meant to address may no longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions
singled out for preclearance. The statute's coverage formula is based on data that is now
more than 35 years old, and there is considerable evidence that it fails to account for current
political conditions.”).
14.
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
15.
Id. (“We issue no holding on § 5 itself, only on the coverage formula.”).
16.
See Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department to File New
Lawsuit Against State of Texas Over Voter I.D. Law, THE U.S DEP’T OF JUST.(Aug. 22,
2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/August/13-ag-952.html.
17.
See Karoun Demirjian, Reid Vows Quick Work on Rewriting Voting Rights Act
After Court Decision, LAS VEGAS SUN, June 26, 2013,
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2013/jun/26/reid-vows-quick-work-rewriting-votingrights-act-a/.
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croached on the principle of equal sovereignty,18 it served the laudable goal
of ensuring everyone the right to vote.19 The same cannot be said of the
effects test.
By definition, the effects test seeks to equalize election results. Racial
groups must be permitted to “elect their preferred candidates of choice.”20
Unsurprisingly, by requiring equal outcomes, the effects test has largely
turned into a mechanism to racially gerrymander election districts.21 However, “‘[s]eparate but equal’ and ‘separate but better off’ have no more
place in voting districts than they have in schools, parks, railroad terminals,
or any other facility serving the public.”22
This Article places the effects test squarely in its crosshairs in the hope
that if preclearance survives, it will only be used to end intentional voting
discrimination. Part II briefly defines the effects test and explains its origins. Part III establishes the proper standard of review for congressional
enactments under the Fifteenth Amendment before explaining why the effects test exceeds that congressional power. Part IV offers three reasons
why the effects test violates the individual right to equal protection.
II.

THE EFFECTS TEST

The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that “[t]he
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.”23 section 2 of that Amendment grants Congress the
power to adopt “appropriate legislation” to enforce that guarantee.24 Congress invoked this power when it adopted the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
section 5 of the Act targeted southern legislatures that had defiantly denied
the right to vote to black Americans by requiring any proposed voting
change to be precleared with the courts or federal government.25

18.
See, e.g., Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (explaining how section 5 encroaches on
federalism); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926 (1995) (detailing section 5’s federalism
costs).
19.
See Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 201-02 (detailing the undeniable successes of the
Voting Rights Act).
20.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b) (2006), invalidated by Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 .
21.
Roger Clegg, The Future of the Voting Rights Act After Bartlett
and NAMUDNO, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 35, 40.
22.
Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
23.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
25.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (explaining how a “covered” jurisdiction must either
obtain approval for its proposed voting change from the District of Columbia District Court
or the Attorney General before the change is deemed effective).
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For its first forty-two years, the text of section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act required that intent be at the heart of all preclearance decisions. The
language by which voting standards were judged required jurisdictions to
demonstrate that it “does not have the purpose and will not have effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote.”26 After years of focusing almost
solely on the effect of proposed voting changes, the Supreme Court explained in Georgia v. Ashcroft that the DOJ should refocus its efforts to
“encourage the transition to a society where race no longer matters.”27
Then, in 2006, Congress amended that language to require jurisdictions to show that a voting practice “neither has the purpose nor will have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color.”28 This subtle change was designed to ensure that intent need never
be present to deny preclearance.29 Congress expanded the “effects test” by
mandating the preclearance be denied where a voting change “will have the
effect of diminishing the ability of any citizens of the United States on account of race or color . . . to elect their preferred candidates of choice.”30
III.
A.

WHY THE EFFECTS TEST EXCEEDS CONGRESSIONAL POWER

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR LEGISLATION PASSED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 2 OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT

Throughout the litigation in both Shelby County and its predecessor,
Northwest Austin, the standard of review was a major point of contention.31
A by-product of the Shelby County Court’s decision to only address the
coverage formula is that the standard of review for legislation adopted pursuant to Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power remains unanswered. The dispute concerns whether Congress need only have a rational basis for invoking its Fifteenth Amendment power, or whether it may
only invoke that power in a manner that is “congruent and proportional” to

26.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, Pub. L. 89-110 ( 1965)
(codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006)) (emphasis added).
27.
See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 490-91 (2003).
28.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
29.
See Roger Clegg & Linda Chavez, An Analysis of the Reauthorized Sections 5
and 203 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Bad Policy and Unconstitutional, 5 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 561, 565 (2007).
30.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b) (2006). The “preferred candidate of choice” language in
section 5(b) of the Voting Rights Act is an extension of the effects test in section 5(a). This
discussion of the effects test in this Article applies equally to the “candidate of choice” requirement.
31.
See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009)
(“[The standard of review] has been extensively briefed in this case, but we need not resolve
it.”); Brief for Petitioner, Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96).
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the individual right to vote irrespective of one’s race. The former standard
would give Congress considerably more latitude for legislation.
The formulation of two independent tests for legislation passed pursuant to Congress’s Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers
has never been articulated by the Court. In cases where the Supreme Court
has reviewed Congressional legislation adopted under one of these powers,
the Court has used precedents from the Fourteenth Amendment and Fifteenth Amendment identically.32
That the enforcement clauses should be treated coextensively is obvious, but two independent reasons call for the more stringent congruent and
proportional review. First, the text and history of the two amendments
demonstrate that its framers intended for Congress to enact similar legislation when needed to enforce the rights guaranteed.33 Second, the Supreme
Court cases that purport to establish a more lenient standard of review fail
to support that narrative upon closer examination.
1.

A Brief History of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section
2 of the Fifteenth Amendment

The Fourteenth Amendment was added to the Constitution in July of
1868.34 Once ratified, the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

32.
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518-28 (1997); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-51 (1966); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 137-39 (1903). See also
Victor Andres Rodriguez, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 After Boerne: The
Beginning of the End of Preclearance, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 769, 786 (2003) (stating that the
history and text of the enforcement powers leads the Supreme Court to treat them identically); Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 294 n.6 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have
always treated the nature of the enforcement powers conferred by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as coextensive.”); Clegg & Chavez, supra note 29, at 570 (“[T]he two
were ratified within nineteen months of each other, have nearly identical enforcement clauses, were both prompted by a desire to protect the rights of just-freed slaves, and indeed have
both been used to ensure our citizens’ voting rights.”).
33.
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”), with U.S. CONST. amend.
XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”).
The City of Boerne Court used precedents from past Voting Rights Act cases to demonstrate
the standard of review under the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at
518 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966); City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980)). That Court also noted that the two clauses were “parallel.” City
of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518. More recently the Supreme Court has reiterated that, “Section 2
of the Fifteenth Amendment is virtually identical to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Bd.
of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 n.8 (2001).
34.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also Douglas H. Bryant, Unorthodox and Paradox: Revisiting the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 555, 575
(2002) (discussing issues surrounding ratification).
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ment would come to represent “a positive grant of legislative power.”35 The
debate surrounding ratification of the Enforcement Clause clarified that the
new grant of legislative power should be seen as “remedial and preventive”
in nature.36 The remedial and preventive nature of the Enforcement Clause
is treated as hornbook law.37
The Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in February of 1870,38 and it
too included an enforcement clause.39 The purpose of that clause was identical: “[M]any Republicans believed that the Fifteenth Amendment would
remain ineffective until and unless it was enforced by additional federal
laws . . . . [I]f no further federal laws were enacted, racial discrimination in
voting would be constitutionally feasible.”40 The framers of the Fifteenth
Amendment believed that the right to vote, irrespective of one’s race,
would only become a reality if Congress retained power to adopt legislation
when called for.
2.

Katzenbach Did Not Announce a Rationality Standard

The idea that mere rationality is the standard of review for legislation
passed pursuant to Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment power stems from
South Carolina v. Katzenbach,41 the Supreme Court’s first Voting Rights
Act case.42 The Court held that “[a]s against the reserved powers of the
States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional
prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”43 The first clause of that
passage is the most important. The Court is not explaining the extent of
congressional power under the Fifteenth Amendment, only Congress’s

35.
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651.
36.
See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520-24 (discussing the ratification history of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
37.
See id. at 525 (citing United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218 (1875); United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1883); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139) (noting
that the Court has always viewed Congress’s power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as corrective or preventive).
38.
See U.S. CONST. amend XV; James Thomas Tucker, Tyranny of the Judiciary:
Judicial Dilution of Consent Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 443, 483-85 (1999) (discussing the congressional history of the Fifteenth Amendment).
39.
U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 2. See also United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 80405 (1966) (discussing ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments).
40.
Xi Wang, The Making of Federal Enforcement Laws, 1870-1872, 70 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1013, 1020 (1995).
41.
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1965).
42.
The district court in Northwest Austin adopted this view. See Nw. Austin Mun.
Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 241-46 (D.D.C. 2008).
43.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324.
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power vis-a-vis the states. “The gist of the matter is that the Fifteenth
Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of state power.”44
The Katzenbach Court explained, however, that rationality was not
“the standard[] which govern[ed] . . . review of the Act.”45 For that point,
the Katzenbach Court turned to the Fifteenth Amendment’s Enforcement
Clause, which allows Congress to “enforce the prohibitions by appropriate
legislation.”46 Further, the Court cited to Ex parte Virginia, a case that
clearly holds that, for congressional legislation to be adopted constitutionally, there must be a closer fit between the ends and the means than mere
rationality.
In the post-Katzenbach cases, while the Court was reaffirming Katzenbach, it was not reaffirming “rational basis” as the standard of review.47
Rather, the Court was continuing—often explicitly—the tradition from Ex
parte Virginia, which held that “legislation is appropriate . . . [when it is]
adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view.”48 For example, in Morgan the Court clarified that section 5 requires that legislation
be “‘plainly adapted’ to furthering . . . [the] aims of the Equal Protection
Clause.”49 The City of Rome Court used similar language.50
3.

City of Boerne and the Congruence and Proportionality Test

In 1997, the Court enunciated a clear standard for evaluating whether
Congress has constitutionally invoked its powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Beginning its analysis with McCulloch and Ex parte Virginia,51 the City of Boerne Court explained that the enforcement clauses limit

44.
Id. at 317.
45.
Id. at 324.
46.
Id. at 326 (emphasis added) (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345
(1879)).
47.
It’s worth noting that had the Court wanted to invoke simple rational basis review, it easily could have. By 1966, “rational basis” review was prevalent in the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938); Carmichael
v. S. Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509 (1937).
48.
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345. See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, 648 (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345). The Morgan Court articulated that
standard of review to require the Court to evaluate whether the legislation is “‘plainly
adapted’ to furthering the[] aims of the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 652. City of Rome is
similar. See City of Rome v. U.S., 446 U.S. 156, 177 (“[U]nder . . . [section] 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress may prohibit practices . . . so long as the prohibitions attacking
racial discrimination in voting are ‘appropriate,’ as that term is defined in McCulloch v.
Maryland [17 U.S. 316 (1819)] and Ex parte Virginia . . . .”).
49.
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652 (emphasis added).
50.
City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 177.
51.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516-18 (1997).
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Congress’s power such that legislation must be “adapted to carry out the
objects the amendments have in view . . . .”52
The City of Boerne Court then analyzed the Voting Rights Act cases
that purport to establish a “rationality” standard.53 The Court recognized
that Congress’s enforcement power extends only to enforcing and remedying the provisions of the amendment invoked.54 “It has been given the power ‘to enforce,’ not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional
violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be enforcing would no
longer be, in any meaningful sense, ‘the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment.’”55 From this analysis, the Court adopted the congruence and
proportionality standard. This means-ends test requires a significant link
between the amendment that Congress seeks to enforce and the legislation
adopted.56
4.

Lopez v. Monterey County and the Post-Boerne Cases

If the Supreme Court applied a more relaxed standard of review in
cases decided after City of Boerne, that would lend credence to the view
that separate standards govern the two different enforcement clauses. In
Northwest Austin, the district court relied on Lopez v. Monterey County57
for its conclusion that Congress need only have some rational basis for
adopting legislation pursuant to its Fifteenth Amendment power.58 A
closer examination of the case reveals the district court’s error.

52.
Id. at 517 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 545).
53.
See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (discussing the holdings of Katzenbach,
Morgan, and City of Rome).
54.
Id. at 519.
55.
Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1965)) (internal
quotations omitted).
56.
“While the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive
change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the
distinction exists and must be observed. There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking
such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and effect. History and our case law support drawing
the distinction, one apparent from the text of the Amendment.”
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20 (emphasis added).
57.
Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266 (1999).
58.
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 239
(D.D.C. 2008) (referring to Lopez as “the final case in this [rational basis] series”).
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In Lopez, the Supreme Court was only considering whether “requiring
preclearance here would tread on rights constitutionally reserved to the
States.”59 The extent of Congress’s power to enact legislation to enforce the
reconstruction amendments was not at issue. Thus, it is unsurprising that
the Lopez Court described its review in rational basis terms. As discussed
above, this is the precise point that gave rise to the “rationality” language in
the first place.60 Lest there be any doubt whether Lopez reaffirmed the rationality standard of review, the Northwest Austin Court announced that the
issue remained an open question.61 Further, given that the two enforcement
clauses should be treated coextensively, it is telling that all Supreme Court
cases reviewing legislation adopted under Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment power have applied the more stringent form of review.62
B.

THE EFFECTS TEST IS NOT CONGRUENT AND PROPORTIONAL TO
ENFORCING FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS

The Fourteenth Amendment bans only disparate treatment—i.e., intentional discrimination—on the basis of race, not disparate impact.63 Disparate impact alone cannot justify a government’s race-based action. Similarly,
the Supreme Court has also held that the Fifteenth Amendment only reaches intentional discrimination.64 Conversely, the effects test only reaches
racially disparate impacts.65 Accordingly, section 5 of the Voting Rights

59.
Lopez, 525 U.S. at 282 (emphasis added).
60.
See supra Part III.A.2.
61.
See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009).
62.
See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999) (reviewing the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act under congruence and proportionality); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62, 81-91 (2000) (using the same review for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act);
Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372-74 (2001) (discussing Title I of
the Americans with Disabilities Act); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,
728-740 (2003) (discussing the Family and Medical Leave Act); Tennessee v. Lane, 541
U.S. 509, 519-34 (discussing the Americans with Disabilities Act).
63.
See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 26465 (1977) (citation omitted) (“[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact.”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
238-46 (1976) (finding no violation solely based on racially disparate impact).
64.
See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982); City of Mobile, Ala. v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62-65 (1980) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted) (“[The Fifteenth]
Amendment prohibits only purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgment by government
of the freedom to vote ‘on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.’”).
65.
To be sure, section 5(a) of the Voting Rights Act also prohibits voting practices
that are adopted with the purpose of abridging the right to vote on the basis of race. See 42
U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006). That language does not raise the equal protection concerns addressed in this Article.
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Act can require preclearance denial where only disparate impact, and not
intentional discrimination, is proven.
To the extent that Congress has the constitutional authority to rectify
racially disparate impacts, however, it must demonstrate that there is “congruence and proportionality” to rights respected by the Fifteenth Amendment. Congress must show that its means—banning racially disparate impacts—is tied to ending intentional racial discrimination in voting. Yet, the
2006 reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act makes no effort to tie its ban
on disparate impacts in voting to intentional discrimination.66 To the contrary, “the record reads like an after the fact justification rather than a serious
effort to provide constitutional justification for the reauthorization.”67
In 2014, the effects test is not needed to remedy widespread intentional discrimination. By 2009, African Americans accounted for over 600 seats
in state legislatures.68 In many of the states in the Deep South—like Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia—the percentage of African Americans mirrors
the racial makeup of the state.69 Further, in many other states, AfricanAmerican representation exceeds population levels.70 And no state with a
population of African Americans greater than three percent failed to elect
an African American to its state legislature.71
As would be expected with these numbers, there are very few instances today of intentional discrimination in state redistricting. According to the
DOJ, only thirteen preclearance objections in the past twelve years involved
allegations of intentional discrimination in redistricting. But a closer examination of those thirteen cases reveals that the number is even lower. For
example, the DOJ inferred intentional discrimination in five of the thirteen
cases, simply because the jurisdiction rejected plans submitted by politically interested groups like the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP).72
66.
See Clegg & Chavez, supra note 29, at 568-69 (demonstrating how the congressional justifications for the effects test are not tied to intentional discrimination).
67.
Id.
68.
Number of African American Legislators, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES
2009, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/legisdata/african-american-legislators2009.aspx (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
72.
Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney General, to Everett T. Sanders
(Apr. 30, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/pdfs/l_043012_ms.pdf (stating that the rejection
of NAACP plan was indicative of intent to discriminate); Letter from Thomas E. Perez,
Assistant Attorney General, to Tommie S. Cardin (Oct. 4, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/pdfs/ l_100411.pdf (stating that the rejection of
the plan and the anecdotal interviews were sufficient to show discrimination); Letter from
Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, to Charles T. Edens (June 27, 2002), availa-
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For example, the DOJ inferred purposeful discrimination in 2002
when a Virginia county did not adopt proposed alternative plans favored by
the “black community.”73 According to the DOJ, the county’s decision to
reject the plan was pretext, but the DOJ cited no evidence in support of its
position. Later that year, the DOJ again inferred intentional discrimination
because South Carolina failed to give proper consideration to alternatives
proposed by interest groups.74 In neither example did the DOJ explain what
actions—short of adopting the plans proposed by the interest groups—
would have satisfied section 5.
The DOJ’s actions contradict clear Supreme Court precedent holding
that jurisdictions are not required to establish “minority districts wherever
possible.”75 Miller v. Johnson concerned the DOJ’s repeated refusal to preclear a Georgia redistricting plan that did not maximize black voting
strength as DOJ urged it to do. After multiple denials, Georgia caved and
simply adopted the “max-black plan” offered by the DOJ. After the DOJ
approved that plan, a challenge was brought under the Equal Protection
Clause. The Court agreed that districts should not be drawn along racial
lines, and chided the DOJ’s section 5 enforcement strategy as precisely the
type of action forbidden by equal protection.76 While Miller may have cabined the DOJ’s overt efforts to draw voting districts along racial lines, there
is little doubt that the DOJ’s primary enforcement strategy is to engage in
racial gerrymandering.77
DOJ’s enforcement of the effects test is done to racially engineer voting districts.78 That purpose is in direct conflict with equal protection, and
can certainly not be said to be congruent and proportional to the rights protected by the Fifteenth Amendment.
ble at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/pdfs/l_062702.pdf(discussing the rejection
of the proposed plan and 3-3-1 district); Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General, to C. Havird Jones (Sept. 3, 2002), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/pdfs/l_090302.pdf(stating that the failure to
adopt the plan shows “intent to retrogress”); Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, to William D. Sleeper (Apr. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/pdfs/l_042902.pdf( discussing the failure to
adopt the proposed plan).
73.
Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, to William D.
Sleeper (Apr. 29, 2002) available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/pdfs/l_042902.pdf at 3.
74.
Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, to C. Havird Jones,
Senior Assistant Attorney General (Sept. 3, 2002), available at
http://justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/ltr/l_090302.php, at 2.
75.
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 925 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
76.
Id. at 927.
77.
Clegg, supra note 21, at 40.
78.
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 902-03 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Williams, J.,
dissenting).
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WHY THE EFFECTS TEST VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION

The effects test, in addition to being an unconstitutional exercise of
congressional power under the Fifteenth Amendment, also violates the
Equal Protection Clause. A facial equal protection challenge to the effects
test could be brought on two separate bases: (1) an overt challenge to a
race-conscious law; or, (2) as a challenge to a congressional law that encourages local and state governments to engage in race-based decision making. In addition, an as-applied challenge could be brought against the effects test on the grounds that its primary purpose is, and for a long time has
been, to encourage presumptively unconstitutional race-based gerrymandering.
A.

THE EFFECTS TEST IS AN OVERT RACIAL CLASSIFICATION

In the years immediately preceding the enactment of the Voting Rights
Act, the Supreme Court looked to the Equal Protection Clause to ensure
equal access to the ballot box.79 “[T]he Constitution visualizes no preferred
class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic qualifications.”80 Two years later, the Voting Rights Act was passed to enforce the
rights guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment. The Act opposed raceconscious voting districts81 and was created to ensure that all individuals be
given the right to vote.82 Under the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme
Court struck down attempts to racially gerrymander voting districts.83
The Fifteenth Amendment right to vote as well as the equal protection
guarantees in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect individuals,
“not groups.”84 Individuality is at the heart of these constitutional amend79.
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963) (“Once the geographical unit for
which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to
have an equal vote—whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation,
whatever their income, and wherever their home may be in that geographical unit. This is
required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
80.
Id. at 380.
81.
Cf. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(explaining why race-specific districts are antithetical to the principle of equality).
82.
See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 582-94 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
83.
See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927-28 (1995) (“It takes a shortsighted and
unauthorized view of the Voting Rights Act to . . . demand the very racial stereotyping the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids.”).
84.
Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (emphasis added). The
Court emphasized that recognizing equal protection as an individual right—and not a group
right—is the bedrock principle of all equal protection jurisprudence. Id. “The rights created
by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are personal rights.” Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22
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ments in order to ensure that persons are treated as individuals, “not as
simply components of a racial . . . class,” because “[r]ace-based assignments embody stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race,
evaluating their thoughts and efforts—their very worth as citizens—
according to a criterion barred to the Government by history and the Constitution.”85
The effects test contravenes this hallmark principle of equal protection
law. It requires cataloging individual voters into broad racial groups—e.g.,
“Hispanic” or “African American”—and determining the validity of voting
policies according to the effect on those groups.86 Yet it is improper to catalog individuals under the law in this manner, as neither individuals’ voting
preferences nor everyday experiences are susceptible to such broad generalizations.87 Nevertheless, the effects test uses these racial group identities to
dole out preferred voting policies, thereby necessarily rejecting the individuality of voters.88 Accordingly, it “bears an uncomfortable resemblance to
political apartheid. It reinforces the perception that members of the same
racial group—regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the
community in which they live—think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.”89
The Supreme Court has taken a harsh view of policies that are reliant
on group-based stereotypes, because they “promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.”90 The political rights of individuals that are supposed to be protected by the Voting Rights Act are secondary to the group-based rights enforced by the effects test, and “the assignment of group identity becomes the crucial determinant of everything
else for the individual.”91 Individuals—both inside and outside of those
racial groups—are required to perpetuate a stereotype that all members of

(1948). See also Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
85.
Miller, 515 U.S. at 911 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
86.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b) (2006).
87.
See PETER WOOD, DIVERSITY: THE INVENTION OF A CONCEPT 25 (2003) (stating
that there is nothing inherent in individuals classified into contemporary racial groups, i.e.,
“black,” “Asian,” “Hispanic,” that justifies laws treating them differently).
88.
Cf. Joshua P. Thompson & Damien M. Schiff, Divisive Diversity at the University of Texas: An Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Overturn its Flawed Decision in
Grutter, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 437, 484 (2011) (demonstrating that racial preferences in
university admissions perpetuate the same pernicious group-based stereotypes).
89.
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
90.
City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (citing Univ. of Cal.
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978)).
91.
WOOD, supra note 87, at 636.
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that group vote alike.92 “[I]t validates and reinforces the dehumanizing habit
of judging people by stereotypes.”93
Because the effects test cannot treat voters as individuals, it perpetuates these pernicious group-based stereotypes. The effects test focuses on a
racial group’s ability to vote as a bloc and elect the “candidate of [its]
choice.”94 Instead of reinforcing the individual right to vote irrespective of
one’s race, the effects test eschews individual rights in favor of a perceived
group right to elect a racial group’s “candidate[] of [its] choice.”95 By transforming the right to vote from an individual right into a racial-group right,
individuals only count insofar as they embody their racial group identity.
As Shelby County was making its way to the Supreme Court, Judge
Williams of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals recognized this flaw in the
effects test.96 As a racial group does not vote as a monolith, it cannot be
said to have a universal “candidate[] of choice.”97 At most, a majority of a
particular racial group can be said to prefer one candidate over the other.
“Thus, when the [effects test] is translated into operational English, it calls
for assuring ‘the ability of a minority group's majority to elect their preferred candidates.’”98
By focusing on the effects a proposed voting change will have on a
“racial group,” the effects test contravenes an individual’s right to equal
protection. Recognizing racial group rights is contrary to the idea of equal
protection under the law since it “literally denies the equal protection of the
laws by providing legal guarantees to some racial groups that it denies to
others.”99 Further, individuals within a “benefitted” racial group are denied
equal protection, because some are forced to adopt candidates that are not
“of their choice.” Judge Williams questioned: “[W]hat happened to the minority group’s own minority—those who dissent from the preferences of the
minority’s majority?”100 The unfortunate answer to Judge Williams’s question is that the effects test has no protections for them.101
92.
See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911-12 (1995).
93.
WOOD, supra note 87, at 186.
94.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b) (2006).
95.
Id.
96.
See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 903-04 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Williams,
J., dissenting).
97.
Id..
98.
Id. Judge Williams explained the overt racial classification inherent in the effects test even more bluntly: “But the implied ‘they’ of § 5 is not a polity in itself; nor is it an
association freely created by free citizens. Quite the reverse: It is a group constructed artificially by the mandate of Congress, entirely on the lines of race or ethnicity.” Id.
99.
Clegg, supra note 21, at 40.
100.
Shelby County, 679 F.3d at 903 (Williams, J., dissenting).
101.
Accordingly, if one accepts the view that section 5 is needed because continued
discrimination against minorities is rampant, she must also condone additional discrimina-
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THE EFFECTS TEST ENCOURAGES RACE-BASED ACTIONS BY LOCAL AND
STATE GOVERNMENTS

As established supra, the effects test goes beyond the reach of the Fifteenth Amendment by targeting racially disparate impacts, not intentional
discrimination.102 Indeed, the effects test only reaches disparate impacts; it
has no other use or function given that purposeful discrimination is already
prohibited by section 5.103 Thus, section 5 mirrors Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits intentional discrimination in employment, but also added provisions in 1991 that prohibit racially disparate impacts.104
The federal government cannot discriminate on the basis of race, nor
can it enact laws requiring covered jurisdictions to do so.105 But by forcing
covered jurisdictions to avoid all racially disproportionate effects—even in
the absence of past discriminatory behavior—that is precisely what the effects test requires. Even where it is conceded that a voting change was not
adopted with discriminatory intent, the effects test “affirmatively requires”
the federal government to act.106 The comparison to Title VII’s disparate
impact provisions comes because both it and the effects test “place a racial
thumb on the scales,” thereby requiring government “to evaluate the racial
outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of)
those racial outcomes.”107 But equal protection is implicit in both scenarios:
a federal statute is requiring state and local actors to think and act race consciously.
One difference between Title VII’s disparate impact and the section 5
effects test is worth highlighting. In a disparate impact challenge, the defendant can avoid liability if it demonstrates that the challenged practice is
job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.108 The effects test contains no similar rebuttal stage, rendering it even
more constitutionally suspect. For example, in 2007 the state of Michigan
tion against minorities who fall within that racial group. The racial minority who dissents
from the group choice is discriminated against twice.
102.
See supra Part III.
103.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006).
104.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (k)(1)(A) (2006).
105.
See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). See
also Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78-82 (1917) (holding unconstitutional a Kentucky
law that forbade individuals from selling certain property to persons of color).
106.
See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring).
107.
Id. See also Kenneth L. Marcus, The War Between Disparate Impact and Equal
Protection, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 53, 61-70 (stating that disparate impact raises serious
equal protection concerns); Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 1341, 1344-45 (2010) (stating the same).
108.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
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decided to close one of its Secretary of State branch offices.109 The DOJ
refused to preclear the change, because it would have a disproportionate
effect on minority voters.110 The DOJ was clear that any change with a “retrogressive effect” will not survive section 5 review.111
Even outside the context of both Title VII and the Voting Rights Act,
courts have recognized that disparate impact theory can force actors outside
the federal government to engage in unconstitutional race-conscious decision making. In Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC,112 the D.C. Circuit rejected the government’s claim that government actions that pressure
or induce private parties to enact race-conscious hiring practices are immunized from strict scrutiny. The court invalidated the FCC’s decision requiring private parties to make race-conscious hiring decisions to achieve
“proper” diversity.113 “[T]he purpose of statistical evidence,” the court
ruled, “is to expose possible discriminatory intent, not to establish a workforce that mirrors the racial breakdown of the . . . [city].”114 Lower courts
have applied strict scrutiny to invalidate similar race-conscious schemes
that pressured others outside of the federal government to use race, even
when they did not require strict quotas.115
The government is prohibited from enforcing or enacting laws that
grant preferential treatment to groups because of their perceived racial or
ethnic origin.116 Yet the effects test is designed for precisely this purpose—
to allow racial groups incontestable voting districts. And experience has
shown that the DOJ enforces the effects test to make safe voting districts.
Thus, as demonstrated below, even if the effects test is not deemed a facial
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, its application makes the unconstitutionality obvious.117

109.
Letter from Grace Chung Becker, Assistant Attorney General, to Brian DeBano,
Chief of Staff and Chief Operating Officer, and Christopher Thomas, Director of Elections
(Dec. 26, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/pdfs/l_122607.pdf.
110.
Id. at 2-3.
111.
Id.
112.
Lutheran Church-Mo. Synod v. FCC, 154 F.3d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
113.
See id. at 492.
114.
Id. at 494.
115.
See, e.g., Walker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973, 981-82 (5th Cir. 1999)
(stating that the race-conscious requirement that public housing units be developed in predominantly nonminority residential areas triggered strict scrutiny and remanding to the lower court to determine whether requirement was constitutional); Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that the requirement that the contractor
make race-conscious efforts triggered strict scrutiny and was unconstitutional).
116.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
117.
Vill. Of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65
(1977).
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THE EFFECTS TEST IS APPLIED UNCONSTITUTIONALLY

Section 5 was an unqualified success at eliminating gross intentional
discrimination by southern legislatures, which it was carefully crafted to
do.118 But over the last twelve years the DOJ has only alleged exclusion of
minorities in three enforcement actions.119 Instead of protecting minority
access to the polls, the DOJ now uses the effects test to ensure racial and
political gerrymandering.120 Of the sixty-seven section 5 objections pursued
since 2000, thirty-nine have centered on redistricting efforts.121 The trivial
details that motivated these preclearance decisions indicate that the DOJ
was more concerned with racial politics and protecting “safe districts” than
with upholding Fifteenth Amendment rights.122
For example, in 2002 the DOJ rejected a proposed redistricting plan in
Virginia that reduced the black share of the population in one district from
55.7% to 55.2%.123 The DOJ acknowledged that population changes had
altered the racial makeup of the area, but nonetheless declared that the
county must manipulate the district to prevent even a minor decrease in
black voting strength and maintain the ability of the black population in that
area to “elect their candidate of choice.”124
An Arizona redistricting plan met a similar fate when, due to population growth, it split one majority-Hispanic district into two majorityHispanic districts.125 The DOJ concluded that the elimination of one district
118.
See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 226-29
(2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119.
Although the Supreme Court has already ruled that voter ID laws are constitutional, Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008), each of these objections
involved voter ID laws. The DOJ’s charge—that they are designed to deny minorities the
right to vote—is similar to the type of problem section 5 was designed to remedy. However,
the DOJ’s objections also raise two legitimate concerns: (1) To what extent should the effects test’s conflict with legitimate voting practices undermine its constitutionality as a congruent and proportional means of enforcing Fifteenth Amendment rights? (2) How can section 5 be congruent and proportional to secure Fifteenth Amendment rights if an identical
law is legal in one state and illegal in another?
120.
See Clegg, supra note 21, at 40.
121.
Section 5 Objection Determinations, THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/obj_activ.php (last visited Jan 1, 2013). This
webpage catalogs all the “Section 5 objections interposed, continued or withdrawn by the
Attorney General since 1965” on a state-by-state basis. Id.
122.
Id.
123.
Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, to Darvin Satterwhite, County Attorney (July 9, 2002), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/ltr/l_070902.php.
124.
Id. at 2-3.
125.
Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, to Lisa T. Hauser
and José de Jesús Rivera (May 20, 2002), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/ltr/l_052002.php.
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with a Hispanic population of 65% and creation of two districts with Hispanic shares of the population of 51.2% and 50.6% violated the effects test,
because in the new districts Hispanic voting populations were insufficient
to “elect their candidate of choice.”126
The DOJ’s interpretation of section 5 has even led it to deny preclearance to redistricting plans that don’t even reduce minority voter strength. In
2001, the DOJ rejected a proposed redistricting plan in Charleston, solely
because projected population growth within the proposed district might
possibly reduce black voter strength sometime in the future.127 The DOJ
acknowledged that population changes made redistricting necessary and
that the proposed plan retained the correct number of majority-minority
districts.128 However, because population projections suggested that the
electorate might diversify and include more white voters in one of the
‘black’ districts, the plan was deemed retrogressive.129
Today the effects test’s main function is to create districts defined by
race—not guarantee individuals the right to vote irrespective of race.130 “In
addition to the illegal and immoral purpose of racial gerrymandering, the
unintended side effects of such racial gerrymandering are abundant.”131

126.
Id. at 3.
127.
Letter from R. Alex Acosta, Assistant Attorney General, to Francis I. Cantwell
(Oct. 12, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/ltr/l_101201.php.
128.
Id. at 2.
129.
Id. at 2-3.
130.
State-imposed racial gerrymanders assume that black voters prefer to exercise
narrow influence over a single district rather than broader influence over many different
competitive districts. Safe black seats isolate the black community and also reduce electoral
competition. Black voters confined to a single constituency, might well be certain of electing
one black candidate, but the elected representative may be the only minority elected—or
because of district politics a member of a small, heavily outnumbered and consequently
ineffective band. Meanwhile, white representatives are insulated from the concerns of the
black electorate and do not have to take their concerns into account. J. R. POLE, THE PURSUIT
OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 449-50 (University of Cal. Press, Berkeley, 2d ed. rev.
1993); D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 96
(Basic Books, Inc. 1987) (stating that proportional representation would “worsen racial
tensions because it distorts the political process in order to create targeted entities less likely
to engage in the coalition building that is the hallmark of American politics”).
131.
Many scholars have written at length about the effects of race-based gerrymandering. See JIM SLEEPER, LIBERAL RACISM 43-66 (1997); Sheryll D. Cashin, Democracy,
Race, and Multiculturalism in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Voting Rights Act Ever Be
Obsolete?, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 71, 90 (2006); Roger Clegg & Joshua Thompson,
Overturn Unconstitutional Voting Rights Act, WASHINGTON TIMES, Nov. 14, 2012; Abigail
Thernstrom, Racial Gerrymandering, NATIONAL REVIEW ( Apr. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/ 265956/racial-gerrymandering-abigail-thernstrom.
See generally Clegg & Chavez, supra note 29 (citing, inter alia, CHRISTOPHER M. BURKE,
THE APPEARANCE OF EQUALITY: RACIAL GERRYMANDERING, REDISTRICTING, AND THE
SUPREME COURT 32-33 (1999); Katharine Inglis Butler, Racial Fairness and Traditional
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THE EFFECTS TEST FAILS STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW

Decisions of the Supreme Court have made clear that distinctions between persons based solely upon their race can only be upheld under “extraordinary justification.”132 The core purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause is to eliminate governmentally sanctioned racial distinctions.133 Any
racial classification by the government is “inherently suspect”134 and “presumptively invalid.”135 Accordingly, to survive an equal protection challenge, the effects test would need to be a necessary means to furthering a
compelling government interest. 136
The Supreme Court has required that any race-based action undertaken
to remedy intentional discrimination must specifically identify the discrimination sought to be remedied.137 Moreover, the government must also have
a “strong basis in evidence” that the means adopted will achieve that
goal.138 Both requirements go to whether the race-based action is narrowly
tailored to the government’s compelling interest in remedying intentional
race-based discrimination.139 But the effects test fails these requirements:
there is little to no evidence that the effects test was designed to remedy
intentional discrimination,140 and there is even less evidence that it is needed to do so.141
V.

CONCLUSION

Are elected minority representatives supposed to represent minorities,
contribute a minority viewpoint, and be the spokesperson for millions of
Districting Standards: Observations on the Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Geographic
Representation, 57 S.C. L. REV. 749, 780-81 (2006)).
132.
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979). Racial classifications are “by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon
the doctrine of equality.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 214 (1995)
(quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). Where the government
proposes to ensure participation of “some specified percentage of a particular group merely
because of its race,” such a preferential purpose must be rejected as facially invalid. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (plurality opinion).
133.
See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989).
134.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223 (citation omitted).
135.
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643-44 (1993).
136.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
137.
City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989).
138.
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909 (1996).
139.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 510.
140.
See supra Part III.B.
141.
See Edward Blum & Lauren Campbell, AM. ENTER. INST., ASSESSMENT OF
VOTING RIGHTS PROGRESS IN JURISDICTIONS COVERED UNDER SECTION FIVE OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT ( 2006), available at
http://www.aei.org/files/2006/05/15/20060515_BlumCampbellreport.pdf.
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individuals who may share similar skin tones? That is how the effects test
views them. But this is not how our civil rights ought to operate. Individuals should be treated as such and not as embodiments of a fictional racial
viewpoint.
The effects test sows the seeds of racial discord by requiring governments to make decisions along racial lines. But experience has shown that
continuing to make race-based decisions is not the way to end discrimination. “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”142
Racial bloc voting is not needed to achieve voting equality. The Voting
Rights Act’s purpose is to provide equality of opportunity, not equality of
outcome. Minorities and majorities should be able to form voting coalitions
on any basis; race should not guarantee voting outcomes. Yet this is the
reality of the effects test. By encouraging racial districts and equality of
outcome, the effects test distorts the abilities of minority candidates and
political organizations. It also maligns the real and substantial achievements
that minorities attain, as well as their expected real and substantial
achievements in the future.143 Legislation that so blatantly violates equal
protection cannot be held to be a constitutional means to ensure the Fifteenth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to vote irrespective of one’s
race.

142.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007).
143.
See id. at 157. Cf. THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 4950 (William Morrow & Co. 1984) (stating that black representation was increasing in many
professions prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964).

